Tracing a Path to Henry Ford’s Economic Policy: Was Ford a Fordist?*

Bruce Pietrykowski
(University of Michigan-Dearborn, USA)

* I wish to extend my gratitude to Donn Werling, Director of the Henry Ford Estate at Fair Lane for allowing me special access to Henry Ford’s book collection. Also, I wish to thank Melissa Frownfelter of the Henry Ford Estate for her kind and able assistance.

I. INTRODUCTION: FORDISM AND FORD MOTOR

The Ford Motor Company was a leading contributor to the economic growth and technological change characteristic of early twentieth-century U.S. history. Ford’s Highland Park and Rouge River plants came to epitomize the mass production era of large-scale, vertically integrated manufacturing facilities. The term «Fordism» became attached to the particular attempt to link large-scale output with high-wage labor inputs. This was exemplified in 1914 by Ford’s «five dollar day». Yet, for Ford Motor to remain Fordist it would have to continue to link mass production with mass consumption. With the aid of archival source material located at the Henry Ford Estate at Fair Lane and the Henry Ford Museum Archives at Greenfield Village, I will offer an interpretive reconstruction of Ford’s affinity with Fordism.

I suggest that Henry Ford’s situation was emblematic of an enduring contradiction between the personal beliefs and the professional interests of the U.S. business elite during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Competitive pressures to reduce production costs impinged on Ford’s effort to implement and legitimately promulgate a highwage policy for U.S. industry. This did not mean that Ford ceased to explore innovative means for producing high volume output while sustaining mass demand for his products. Ford’s experiments with industrial decentralization, together with his interest in worker cooperatives suggest that Henry Ford’s vision of economic progress remained at odds with the majority of his contemporaries in the field of business and economics.

The term «Fordism» is currently in vogue among social scientists and historians. It is used to provide a synoptic account of the mass production technologies put in place in the major manufacturing industries (particularly steel, autos, and durable household goods) of the 20th century.

The term also evokes images of the Highland Park plant and behemoth Rouge River complex owned and operated by Henry Ford and the Ford Motor Company. Indeed, sometime between 1929 and 1933, the Marxist political theorist Antonio Gramsci wrote an essay entitled Americanism and Fordism in which he described the dominance of American culture and society in terms of the productive efficiencies unleashed by the Ford system of mass production and mass consumption. Gramsci understood that mass production required not just the creation of a new workers with a new ethos of work that broke from the craft traditions of pride, skill and fraternity. In addition, he realized that the role of the family and the relationship between men and women would also need to be re-defined in order to facilitate the mass production and reproduction of industrial workers themselves[1].

While used by European social scientists since at least the late 1940s, the concept of Fordism was, until recently, largely neglected by American economists and historians. As the economist Felix Tamm states, «Apparently the theoreticians of the major American universities’ economic departments are unaware of Henry Ford’s economic policy decisions.»[2] Indeed, even Tamm seems to implicitly to equate Fordism with the Keynesian theory of aggregate demand. I will argue that Ford’s statements regarding business policy and economic affairs consistently reflected the desire to create such a sufficient level of consumer demand that government intervention would be rendered unnecessary. As an independent businessman, Ford’s actions sometimes deviated from his public statements.

II. TOWARD FORD’S ECONOMIC POLICY

Direct evidence of Ford’s wage policy is ample. His public pronouncements during the 1910s through the early 1930s echo the recurring theme that wage growth leads directly to economic growth. The ways in which Ford sought to articulate this theme are highly suggestive because they reveal the relatively sophisticated economic ideas bound up in Ford’s words.

A. Wages, Morale and Productivity Growth

In the October 4, 1919 edition of the Dearborn Independent, Ford — without a hint of irony – argued, «Men will not work with a will if they believe their effort is going to increase the dividends of idle stockholders or the private fortunes of men already too rich for the good of society». Despite the obvious contradiction between Ford’s personal wealth and the populist tenor of his statement, Ford made the connection between wages and morale. Interestingly, the modern economic theory of «efficiency wages» similarly maintains that a firm can maximize profits by paying a wage above the market wage if the resulting wage premium earned by workers elicits greater work effort from them[3]. Additionally, if workers feel that they are receiving a «fair wage» this, too, will influence their decision to work or shirk on the job[4].

B. High Wages Linked to Leisure Time and Increased Consumption

The foundation of Fordism rests on the linkage between mass production and mass consumption. Yet, as Gramsci noted, high wages alone will not necessarily induce consumption if certain pre-conditions for mass consumption — patterns of behavior and institutional rules suited to a mass consumption society — have not been created. One of the necessary conditions for successful mass consumption was increased time in which to engage in consumption activities. Ford acknowledged this much when, in 1926, he argued:

Of course for Ford, increased leisure would necessarily be accompanied by wages sufficient to allow workers to purchase more goods. Certainly in light of the Great Depression this interpretation of Ford’s words gains additional persuasive power. Yet, although Ford was by no means prescient and did not anticipate the economic collapse of the 1930s, it would be difficult, in my opinion, to interpret his 1926 comments differently.

While he does not explicitly identify consumption with the use of the market, Ford did acknowledge that consumption requires the use of time. Similarly, in his classic 1937 article of The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase argued that the use of markets is a costly process because individuals are required to search for the relevant product, compare prices, negotiate and write contracts for purchase and sale. While Coase focused on the transaction costs incurred by businesses we can also note that these costs are similarly borne by consumers. So, for mass consumption to be effective, consumers need time to devote to comparison shopping, browsing and simple «window shopping».

The link between high wages and increased leisure seems antithetical to the interests of profit-hungry business owners. Yet, Ford understood the need to develop a culture of consumption that would complement the technological system of mass production. In addition, however, the policy proposals of Ford did create the distinct possibility for a shift in the balance of power between employers and their employees. While this was surely an unintended consequence of Ford’s economic policy proposals it is one of the more striking insights to be gained from an industrialist who is known more for his disdain for the motivation and talent displayed by the average worker[6]. Not content to speculate about the benefits of a high wage economy, Ford actually sought to implement these policies in his own plants.

III. THE SCOPE OF FORD’S WAGE-SETTING PRACTICE

The most notable event in the history of Ford’s wage policy must be the introduction of the five dollar day. Was the five dollar day merely a public relations stunt — which it most certainly was — or did it also embody a coherent vision of economic growth held by Henry Ford? While the fact of such a wage policy is undisputed, the scope of the policy is open to question and exploration.

Economic theory maintains that wages paid above the market clearing level would be profitable for the employer if they accomplished one or more of the following objectives:

(a) Reduced shirking and quitting by workers and induced greater work effort and productivity.

(b) Allowed employers to select those workers among the pool of job applicants who possessed the best personal qualities (for example ambition, moral character, and deference to authority). This policy allowed Ford access to the high productivity workers currently employed at other companies.

(c) Forestalled unionization when used as part of a union avoidance strategy.

(d) Raised consumer demand.

Meyer, for example, claims that the five dollar day was implemented in order to reduce the incidence turnover due to quitting and absenteeism[7]. Raff and Summers argue that the five dollar day was both a means to increase worker productivity and a strategy to stave off unionization[8]. Piore and Sabel suggest that Ford’s wage policy enabled worker-consumers to purchase the products they produced[9].

While none of the above explanations are mutually exclusive – indeed they each provide important insights into the complex task of harnessing mass production technology in an era of social and political tumult both on and off the shop floor — we can identify problems with some of these explanations for the rise of the five dollar day. For instance, if high wages were generally available to most Ford employees, an explanation based on the strategy of diffusing consumer purchasing power through increased wage payments appears quite plausible. If, on the other hand, Ford limited these payments to only those who embodied those personal values esteemed by Ford himself, then the five dollar day may have had more to do with gaining access to the most productive workers in the local, and even national, labor market than with expanding consumer purchasing power.

For instance, the monitoring of workers’ home lives by investigators employed in Ford’s Sociological Department is cited as evidence that Ford only wanted workers who eschewed bad habits such as drinking and gambling. It was important for Ford to create idealized character traits to present as the standard model of the efficient industrial worker[10]. Part of this ideal representation required a redefinition of skill and a new conception of manly labor. Lewchuk, for example, has argued that Ford wanted to create a new cult of masculinity in order to endow the assembly line worker with respectable skills based on speed and the production of quality output[11]. But, in order to effectively maintain a cult of masculinity women would find no place in the Ford shops. Yet, women did work at Ford Motor[12], albeit in a limited capacity.

The dominant accounts of the role played by women in the development of the U.S. auto industry suggests that they were segregated from male workers and relegated to production tasks (sewing, trim work and light assembly) that reflected women’s tradition roles in household work[13]. If gender segregation was in force at Ford we should also expect to find a pattern of wage payments that reflected women’s secondary role in the production process. Yet, the practice of Fordism required not merely the deployment of labor in accordance with a finely delineated division of labor, by skill, race and gender, but also the linkage between mass production and mass consumption. The relevance of this discussion to Ford’s economic policy lies in the extent to which employees directly benefitted from high wages at Ford. Traditional labor market analysis suggests that if the wage rate for women was below the male rate then rational employers would pay the prevailing (lower) wage for women workers. Therefore auto makers like Ford would employ women primarily in order to take advantage of their relatively low wages. While it is true that Ford employed mostly men to work in the auto plants, in at least one case women employed in the production of parts received wages that equalled or exceeded wage rates paid to male workers at competing auto manufactures. Ford did not automatically pay the prevailing market wage — a wage for parts production labor that was even lower in Michigan than in the rest of the United States — for women workers at the Phoenix parts plant.

Tables 1 and 2 make use of a data set derived from personnel records of Ford Motor Company employees at work at Ford’s Phoenix plant. The Phoenix plant began operation in 1922 with work transferred from the Highland Park plant. It was part of the system of small parts plants powered by hydroelectricity. These «village industry» plants produced parts originally manufactured at the Highland Park and Rouge plants. The Phoenix plant, located some twenty-five miles northwest of Detroit employed only females in the production of voltage regulators, generator cut-outs and stoplight switches. The work force consisted of primarily unmarried women. In fact, if a Phoenix worker married she had to quit her job at Ford. This reflected Ford’s philosophy that the male of the family should be the sole provider. Yet, for the single woman working at Ford, it also promoted the Fordist philosophy of extending worker earning power as widely as possibly throughout the community. Indeed, the data in Table 1 reveal that Phoenix women workers received hourly wages that exceeded the average hourly wage for female manufacturing workers. Indeed, up until the Great Depression Phoenix women were earning hourly wages that exceeded the wage of males, even skilled males, employed in manufacturing as a whole. Table 2 shows that through the 1920s women auto workers earned a wage slightly below the auto industry average. Since the auto industry was a male domain it would not be an exaggeration to claim that women workers at Phoenix earned wages that were comparable to the wages earned by men in the auto industry during the 1920s. Again, only with the advent of the economic decline of the 1930s did Phoenix wages begin to lag substantially behind the wages of auto workers as a whole.

Therefore, even in cases where Ford could have paid lower wages and still retained access to high quality female workers the Company paid wages that far exceeded the market wage. This finding suggests that Ford practiced the wage policy that he preached, at least until conditions forced him to pay more attention to his firm’s survival than to the economic wellbeing of the national economy. While the Great Depression shifted the focus of Ford’s economic policy it did not shake the foundation of Ford’s belief that economic growth must be tied to the actions of private individuals – businessmen and laborers- even if this meant expanding the scope and power of labor at the expense of big business.

IV. FORDISM WITHOUT KEYNES

In many ways, Ford’s understanding of the economy was premised on the notion that capital and labor alone are able to generate sufficient output and demand. This idea resonates with the pre-Keynesian economic order within which mass production helped to create untapped markets. However, in the 1930s, when the functional relationship between mass production and mass consumption was unraveling Ford was unwilling to give his approval to government intervention to prop up aggregate demand. Indeed, Ford’s policy position grew increasingly irrelevant[14]. To the classical economists of the time, Ford’s high wage strategy was terribly simplistic because it failed to account for the effect of wages on prices. The classical economist A.C. Pigou argued, in part, that the issue of effective demand rested on fluctuations in the value of money, and hence the real wage, rather than the money wage. Therefore a wage reduction would be expected to have the effect of boosting employment. Lower wages would reduce the cost of production which would reduce product prices and therefore spur both employment and purchases. This would act to alleviate unemployment[15].

Keynes, while cognizant of the distinction between money and real wages, presented a complex argument. First, wage reductions may not have the assumed downward effect on prices[16]. Because money itself is subject to different uses (transaction versus speculation, for example), variations in the supply of money are incapable of responding effectively to a shortfall in spending by both consumers and business investors. In large part this is due to the fact that expectations regarding the future affect the demand for money and the decision to spend or invest one’s money. When expectations are poor the aggressive and assertive actions required to correct the economic downturn may not be forthcoming[17]. In this case, action by a third party — neither worker/consumer nor employer/investor — becomes necessary in order to initiate spending, employment and investment. Given the nature of this debate within economics — namely, over the flexibility prices and the ability of prices to effectively allocate resources — Ford’s policies and pronouncements were pushed to the margins of public debate and discourse. The representatives of business interests in Washington came increasingly to be represented by large lobbying groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce[18]. In response to this situation Ford began to explore alternative means by which to organize production.

One way to construct a picture of the ideas that helped to influence Henry Ford is to conduct a review of the books located in Henry Ford’s residence — Fair Lane. The process of assembling and reviewing books relating to economics housed in Ford’s library, office and bedroom has, to the author’s knowledge, never been undertaken. A complete inventory of books classified by topic is given in the Appendix.

It would be facile to assume that these books directly reflected Henry Ford’s thinking about the economy and economic policy. In many cases well-wishers sent books to Ford because they thought he might find such works of interest. The large collection of works by Irving Fisher, for instance, may not be so much indicative of Ford’s interest in Fisher’s views on monetary policy as a reflection of Fisher’s and Ford’s interest in healthy living, exercise, and abstinence from alcohol[19]. So, a literal reading of Henry Ford’s library collection as a way of mirroring Ford’s thought processes is inherently flawed. Instead, I argue that there is a relationship, if not direct correspondence, between the texts and their owner. Individual authors and well-wishers were indeed motivated to send Ford copies of certain books not because they thought he would find them intellectually inadequate or contrary to his own views but, more likely, because they felt that he would be inclined to find that the books would find a hospitable intellectual environment in the hands of Mr. Ford.

The books relating to business and economics located in Mr. Ford’s library and living quarters at Fair Lane[20] can be divided into the following broad topic areas:

1. Business Management (7)

2. Economic Policy, Economic Recovery, and War Reconversion Proposals (16)

3. General Economics, Labor, and Trade Policy (27)

4. Finance, Stocks and Bonds (28)

5. Miscellaneous (16)

As shown in the Appendix, Ford’s collection of economics and business texts represents an eclectic mix of authors and intellectual persuasions. The books range from self-published diatribes and anti-Semitic vitriolic against Federal control of the money supply; to proposals to restructure the U.S. tax system in line with Henry George’s single tax philosophy; to economic recovery blueprints issued by the Keynesian-oriented Brooking Institute.

Several of the books listed in the business management category represent a «social gospel» approach to secular problems facing businessmen in the 1920s and 1930s. By this, I refer to the attempt to provide businessmen with a rhetoric of self-improvement and personal responsibility with which they could then make sense of their own and their workers’ position in the social hierarchy. For instance, in his book Making Good in Business, Roger W. Babson declares,

Of the books dealing with economic theory and economic policy there is remarkably little written by the main protagonists in the debate over the future of economics. In particular, the lack of texts by John Maynard Keynes and A.C. Pigou is striking. It suggests the existence of a gulf between, on the hand, the debate within economics over the key institutions necessary for economic growth and, on the other hand, Ford’s own understanding of the economic changes that were taking place around him.

To be sure, care must be taken in making general statements about Ford’s economic ideas based solely on the collection of books housed at Fair Lane. There are precious few marks or notes in any of the books so we cannot even be sure if Ford even read them. However, where Henry Ford is mentioned by name or where the exploits of the Ford Motor Company are detailed there is usually a mark on the page. For example, in C. William Hazelett’s I.T. (Incentive Taxation), published in 1936, there are marks on pages describing: (1) the devastating effects of reduced investment on employment (p. 16-17); (2) Ford’s high wave policy (p. 47-48); and (3) Ford’s status as the outstanding representative of capital in the world (p. 147). Hazelett goes on to say, «We believe in learning our economics from the facts and policies of successful people only. This leads to the conclusion that income is not based upon high prices but upon production»[22]. The emphasized portion of the quote above is underlined in pencil in Henry Ford’s copy of the book. This at least suggests that Ford was aware of the destabilizing effects of price changes on real income. However, by 1936 the U.S. economy was moving in a direction quite different from the path of suggested by Henry Ford. However, not one to avoid experimentation, Ford continued throughout the 1930s to focus more of his attention on alternative methods of organizing production. These experiments were based in part on his knowledge of the history of the cooperative movement in the Britain and the United States.

Among the books possessed by Ford, a small subset of the books categorized as «miscellaneous» describe the structure and practice of worker cooperatives based on Robert Owens’ experiments in cooperative production at New Harmony, Indiana. In fact, in Ford’s copy of The New Harmony Movement by George Lockwood[23] was found a clip of paper upon which Henry Ford wrote: «Three things my friend needs man to succeed: patience, honesty and character.» In addition to the book on New Harmony, the Ford personal library at Fair Lane also contains a biography of Robert Owen by R. Davies[24]. These books reflect Ford’s interest in industrial decentralization and worker cooperatives.

A much-neglected aspect of Ford’s engagement with economic ideas concerns his interest in worker cooperatives and the Utopian Socialist experiments of individuals like Robert Owen. Ford’s interest in promoting greenfield industries that would link agrarian life with industrial efficiency and productivity undoubtedly help to fuel his interest in the «village industry» plants discussed earlier. Indeed, Ford’s proposal for a regional district of small-scale mass production enterprises linked by hydroelectric power to be located at Muscle Shoals, Alabama is additional proof that in the 1920s and 1930s Ford became disenchanted with industrial centralization.

In 1926 Ford stated that industrial facilities were located in cities because the demand for industrial labor was unpredictable and could be better satisfied by locating near a large enough pool of job seekers. Yet, «A district of this character, where a majority of people take unemployment as a natural condition, certainly cannot be prosperous, and the living conditions cannot approach those necessary for a decent standard of health»[25]. By moving industry out into the countryside he would solve several economic problems at once. «Therefore, to get rid of the high overhead [costs] of the big city, to try to find balance between industry and agriculture, and more widely distribute the purchasing power of the wages we pay among people, who buy our products, we began to decentralize»[26]. This suggests that Ford was becoming more concerned with the vulnerability of industry to fluctuations in the business cycle and sought to do something about it.

As early as 1917, Ford was corresponding with a Mr. H.H. Schenk, a forty-seven year old farmer from Mt. Hope Farms in Memphis, Missouri regarding the organizational structure of farming cooperatives[27]. In addition, Ford engaged in at least one experiment that established a worker cooperative in Ypsilanti, Michigan during the 1930s. The Ypsilanti plant was one of the larger village industry plants, employing 500 workers. In addition to producing generators and starters, workers at Ypsilanti were also given access to farm land to work. The farm production unit of this village industry enterprise was organized as a worker cooperative. Each member of the cooperative was both a Ford worker and a member shareholder in the agricultural cooperative. An elected board of trustees — made up of worker-farmers – established the by-laws and the organizational structure of the cooperative. Of course, all board decisions were subject to final approval by Henry Ford. But, as a New York Times reporter maintained, «He [Ford] insists on members working out their own problems in their own way, retaining the power of veto only in case of a major difficulty that might threaten the cooperative plan»[28].

The Ypsilanti cooperative allowed worker-farmers to share in the profits earned from selling surplus agricultural products. A commissary provided workers with up to $52 worth of produce a month. Any unused portion of the $52 monthly allotment was paid to workers in cash. Workers laid off from work at Ford’s parts plant were thus able provide some food for their families through the cooperative system.

The theme of industrial decentralization can be seen as one of Ford’s key strategies for economic revitalization during the Depression years. Ford gave media interviews to reporters writing for The Rotarian, the American Legion Monthly, New York Times, Liberty Magazine and the New York World Telegram, on the idea of revitalizing industry in combination, with agriculture by returning to small-scale production. So, over time Ford’s economic policy expanded to include this additional alternative to the system of production premised on the separation of labor income from capital income. Increasingly, however, Ford’s explorations no longer appeared compatible with the development of a national economic strategy that focused on the use of fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand for goods and services.

V. CONCLUSION

I have argued that Ford’s economic policy of high wages was based on his experiences at Highland Park, the Rouge and at the small village industry plants in rural southeastern Michigan. This policy may well have supported multiple goals: reduction of turnover, union avoidance, increased purchasing power. However, the policy is consistent with the contemporary understanding of Fordism as a system that requires both mass production of goods and mass consumption on the part of worker/consumers.

Yet, the link between Fordism and Keynesian economic policy must be made without the help of Henry Ford. Ford consistently maintained that a private market economy was viable as long as capitalists acted to promote the interest of their employees. Yet, in practice even Ford failed to live up to his own economic philosophy. The severity and the length of the Great Depression forced him to cut wages, to begin to question the logic of mass industrialization, and to turn instead to decentralized production of manufactured goods and agricultural produce. To this end he began to experiment with agricultural worker cooperatives as a way of structuring this small scale agrarian model of industrial development.

Ford’s economic policy was not static. Rather it was fragmented, partial and dynamic, reflecting the problems and possibilities inherent in the U.S. system of production technology, industrial relations and consumer culture in the early twentieth century. Certainly in one sense Ford was a proponent of Fordism. However, by denying a role to government in the support and maintenance of consumer spending and investment, he was also an opponent of the fully developed regime of Fordism that linked mass production to mass consumption bolstered by an active system of welfare state expenditures. Rather than resolving the issue of the «Fordist» nature of Ford’s economic policy once and for all, I wish to argue that in tracing the path to Ford’s policies we can uncover evidence that helps us to make better sense of the complex, contradictory and contentious ideas that were advanced by American business leaders in the early twentieth century.

APPENDIX

Economic-Related Books Located in the Library of Henry Ford’s Estate at Fair Lane

(Classified by Subject Area)

Business Management

Babson R.M. Making Good in Business. N.Y.: Revell, 1921.

Barnes R.M. Work Methods Manual. N.Y.: Wiley, 1944.

Brown J.S. The Facts of Life in Business. N.Y.: Lippincott, 1942.

Godkin J.D. The Great Awakening: A Business Man’s Gospel. S.l.: Dorrance, 1926.

Jones E.D. Business Administration. N.Y.: The Engineering Magazine Co, 1914.

McCormick C. P. Multiple Management. N.Y.: Harper, 1938.

Wiren A.R., Heyel C. Practical Management Research. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1945.

Economic Policy, Economic Recovery and War Reconversion Proposals

Babson R.W. The Future of World Peace. S.I.: Babson’s Statistical Organization, 1915.

Berle A.A., Dickinson J., Onthank A.H. et al. America’s Recovery Program. Oxford: Oxford Univ. press, 1934.

Clapp E.J. Economic Aspects of the War. New Haven: Yale Univ. press, 1915.

Hazelett C.W. I.T. (Incentive Taxation): A Key to Security. N. Y.: Dutton, 1936.

Johnson O.W. An Answer to Chaos: The Coming Economic Life or Edward Bellamy’s Theory Reduced to Working Form. S.I.: Publ. by author, 1933.

Larkin J.C. From Debt to Prosperity: The Proposals of Social Credit. N.Y.: The New Economic press. S.a.

Laycock J.N. Employment Unlimited. S. 1.: Cole-Noble Co., 1945.

Martin P.M. Prohibiting Poverty: Suggestions for a Method of Obtaining Economic Security. N.Y.: Farrar and Rinehart, 1933.

Moulton H.G. Income and Economic Progress. Wash. (D.C): The Brookings Institution, 1935.

Newfang O. The Road to World Peace. N.Y.: Putnam, 1924.

Paish G. The Way to Recovery. N.Y.: Putnam, 1931.

Peabody F.W. Honour of Dollars. Sydney (Australia): Cornstalk Publ., 1928.

Recent Economic Changes in the United States: Report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes of the President’s Conference on Unemployment. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1929. Vol. 1, 2.

A Tax Program for A Solvent America. The Committee on Postwar Tax Policy. N. Y.: Ronald press, 1945.

Torpats J. Economic Basis for World Peace. N.Y.: Felsberg, 1941.

Warren G.F. Pearson F. Prises. N.Y.: Wiley, 1933.

General Economics, Labor and Trade Policy

Alderfer E.B., Michl H.E. Economics of American Industry. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1950.

Brookings R.C. Economic Democracy: America’s Answer to Socialism and Communism. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1929.

Bjorset B. Distribute or Destroy! L.: Stanley Nott. 1936.

Butters J.K., Lintner J. Effects of Federal Taxes on Growing Enterprises. Boston: Harvard Univ. press, 1945.

Clay H. Economics: An Introduction for the General Reader. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1923.

Colean M.J. The Impact of Real Estate Finance in the United States. N.Y.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950.

Cooke M.L., Murray P. Organized Labor and Production. N. Y.: Harper, 1946.

Cost of Government in the United States: 1928–1929. N. Y.: National Industrial Conference Board. 1931.

Fabricant S. Employment in Manufacturing, 1899–1939. N.Y.: National Bureau of Economic Research. S.a.

Furber H.W. Both Protection and Free Trade. Boston: Boston Publ. Co, 1888.

George H. Progress and Poverty. N.Y.: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1942.

George H. Protection or Free Trade. N.Y.: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1942.

Hale R.S. The Revolution of Economics. Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1938.

Harwood E.C. Cause and Control of the Business Cycle. S. 1.:American Institute for Economic Research, 1939.

Hedrick W.O. The Economics of Food Supply. N.Y.: Appleton, 1924.

Keller E.A., A Study of the Physical Assets, Sometimes Called Wealth, of the United States: 1922-1933. Notre Dame (Ind.): Univ. of Notre Dame, 1939.

McGregor A.G. The Correct Economy for the Machine Age. L.: Pittman, 1935.

Moulton H.G. The Philosophy of Public Debt. Wash. (D.C.): The Brookings Institution, 1943.

Nathan R.R. National Income, 1929-1936. Wash. (D.C.): US Gov. Print. Office, 1937.

Nordegg M. The Fuel Problem of Canada. Toronto: Macmillan, 1930.

Nourse E.G., Drury H.B. Industrial Price Policies and Economic Progress. Wash. (D.C.): Brookings Institution, 1938.

Robinson J.E. Wrong Remedies. N. Y.: Knickerbocker press, 1923.

Samson S. First Reader In Economics. Boston: The Christopher Publ. House, 1937.

Smith A. An Inquiry Into The Causes of the Wealth of Nations. N. Y.: Dutton, 1914.

Sumner W.G. Protection in the United States. N.Y.: New York Free Trade Club. 1886.

Thompson J.S. More Progress and Less Poverty. N. Y.: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1942.

Which? Protection of Free Trade. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1888.

Finance, Stocks and Bonds

Bannister L.H. The True Philosophy of Money. S.I.: Louis Herbert Bannister, 1937.

Brown J.B. Rescue from Chaos S.L.: Publ. by author, 1934.

Campbell H.O. Socialized Money. Seattle (Wash.): Homer Orpheus Campbell, 1933.

Conserving Your Wealth. N.Y.: Fiduciary Trust Co. of New York, 1936.

Coughlin C.E. The New Deal in Money. Royal Oak (Mi.): The Radio League of the Little Flower, 1933.

Dallas C.D. You and Your Money. Bridgeport (Conn.): Braunworth, 1938.

DeWitt W.E., Polk K. Free Money: What it Means to Industry and Agriculture. S. 1., S. a.

Engledow J. Holy War: The Menace of International Finance. S.I.: Publ. by author, 1936.

Fisher I. The Money Illusion. N.Y.: Adelphi, 1928.

Fisher I. The Stock Market Crash and After. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1930.

Fisher I. Stable Money: A History of The Movement. N. Y.: Adelphi, 1934.

Fitsimmons O.K. Two Dollars. S. 1.: Utilitarian Science Extension, 1939.

Gang A. Monetary Reform and Federal Insurance: The Way Out. S.1., 1934.

Garrett G. A Bubble That Broke the World. Boston. Little Brown, 1932.

Gillman C.F. The Magna Carta of Equity. S. 1., 1940.

Jerome E. Governments and Money. Boston: Little Brown, 1935.

Lawson A. Direct Credits for Everybody: Showing How Capitalism Will Work. Philadelphia: Arnold, 1931.

Mack H.L. Something for Nothing. S. 1.: Carmel press, 1936.

McCormick H.M. Money, Freedom and Progress. S.I.: The Valley press, 1939.

Mclver D.T. Debated Currency. S. 1.: Publ. by author, 1933.

Morgan-Webb C. The Rise and Fall of the Gold Standard. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1934.

O’Neil L.D., DiVenuti B. Visual Outline of Money and Banking. N. Y.: Longmans, Green and Co, 1937.

Overholster W.A. History of Money in the United States. S. 1.: Progress Publishing Concern, 1936.

The State Bank of the U.S.S.R. S.1., 1925.

Voorhis J. Out of Debt, Out of Danger. N.Y.: Devin-Adair, 1943.

Warburg J.P. The Money Muddle. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934.

Warshow R.I. The Story of Wall Street. N. Y.: Greenberg, 1929.

Miscellaneous

Boucke O.F. Limits of Socialism. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1920.

Bromfield L. A Few Brass Tacks. N. Y.: Harper, 1946.

Cummins B.V. The White Man’s Burden or How to Make the Millionaire Work. S. 1.: Publ. by author, 1916.

Davies R. Robert Owen — Socialist. L.: Robert Sutton, 1907.

Fillmore C.F. Prosperity. Kansas City: Unity School of Christianity, 1937.

Garns J.S. Prosperity Plus. Minneapolis: The School of Psychology and Divine Science, 1938.

Hare’s Bank: A Record, 1673-1932. L., 1932.

Hill N. Think and Grow Rich S.1.: The Ralston Society, 1944.

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РЕЗЮМЕ СТАТЬИ Б. ПЕТРИКОВСКИ

В 1910–1920-е годы Генри Форд связывал крупное массовое производство с развитием массового потребления, считая это важнейшими задачами бизнеса. Развивать потребление — значит создавать за счет удешевления продукции и высокой оплаты труда устойчивый платежеспособный спрос. Высокий уровень потребления должен достигаться объединенными усилиями труда и капитала без вмешательства государства и профсоюзов. Оно не потребуется, если работник будет прямо заинтересован в результатах труда, а это уже зависит от предпринимателя. Он не только провозглашал данные принципы, но и претворял их в жизнь. Эта система получила название «фордизм», но всегда ли и насколько ей следовал сам Форд?

В 1914 г. он установил самый высокий в промышленности минимум оплаты труда рабочих — пять долларов в день, который распространялся на всех работников без вредных привычек и с выраженным стремлением к материальному благополучию (их было подавляющее большинство). Система фордизма сформировалась и действовала, пока ее ключевой принцип, считавшийся Фордом универсальным и неизменным — рост производства, высокие заработки, высокое потребление, не обнаружил свою несостоятельность в период Великой депрессии.

Связь между производством и потреблением Форд понимал слишком прямолинейно и упрощенно. Он сводил ее к взаимодействию двух факторов — капитала и труда, игнорировал зависимость спроса от реальной заработной платы, от социально-экономической политики государства, от инвестиционной и потребительской активности.

В 1930-е годы Форд разуверился в возможностях предпринимателей постоянно платить высокую заработную плату, подверг сомнению необходимость развивать и далее крупную промышленность в городах. Он продолжил начатый им ранее эксперимент по созданию мелкого децентрализованного производства в сельской местности, на базе малых гидроэлектростанций. Это были небольшие цеха по изготовлению малогабаритных авточастей – фар, карбюраторов и т.п., цеха, расположенные ранее на территории основных заводов. В качестве рабочей силы привлекались местные фермеры, совмещавшие эту работу с сельским хозяйством и состоявшие в фермерских кооперативах. Их доход складывался из прибыли от продажи сельскохозяйственной продукции и заработной платы на предприятии, что делало их материальное положение более прочным, чем у рабочих в крупных городах.

На изменение взглядов Форда определенным образом повлияла литература по экономике, менеджменту, вопросам трудовых отношений и организации труда, имевшаяся в его личной библиотеке. Часть книг присылали ему сами авторы. Хотя Форд читал мало и редко пользовался «книжными знаниями», по интересовавшим его вопросам он обращался и к литературе. В ряде книг имеются пометки, сделанные его рукой. Так, его привлекал опыт создания сельских производственных кооперативов, в том числе эксперименты социалиста-утописта Роберта Оуэна в штате Индиана.

В мелкой сельской промышленности Форд видел альтернативу не только крупному производству, которое подвержено воздействию кризисов, влиянию профсоюзов, где имеют место конфликты между трудом и капиталом, но и «новому курсу» Ф.Д. Рузвельта с государственным регулированием экономики, правом рабочих на коллективный договор и т.д.

Форд был незнаком с теорией Дж. М. Кейнса о стимулировании спроса за счет роста государственных расходов и социальных программ, но показал себя ее убежденным противником. «Государству всеобщего благосостояния» он противопоставил иную организацию труда. Таким образом, само массовое потребление оказалось для Форда преходящим принципом, признание им которого всецело зависело от того, что в его основе – забота предпринимателя о своих рабочих, или государственное регулирование.

Б.М. Шпотов