Аннотация

The article is devoted to comparing the foreign assistance policies of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations and studying the role of aid agencies’ leaders in carrying out these policies. As a result, it is possible to conclude that the Democrats, more than the Republicans, were inclined to radicalism in aid planning since almost all of social groups that constituted the Democratic Party (mostly, producers of industrial goods) were oriented toward the formation of a single global market as rapidly as possible. As the GOP was not so homogeneous and comprised of more contradictory interests (including the very powerful military-industrial, traditional-conservative, and progressive components), it could not produce the same unified attitude toward the use of foreign aid. Besides, it is interesting to note that every new stage of the internal strife for the right to direct the aid policy demanded a new type of a leader: Harry Bennett was a scientist, Stanley Andrews — bureaucrat, Harold Stassen — politician, John Hollister — businessman and millionaire. James Smith — soldier, and James Riddleberger — diplomat. Though during Eisenhower’s presidency the factor of continuity in aid had been formed, its significance reduced drastically during the transition to Kennedy’s rule, who dramatically changed aid policy from «security» to «development” aid.